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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The point of intervention on the iter criminis (i.e. ‘the route to crime’) is no longer as clear-cut as 
it used to be. Whereas criminal law traditionally targeted the full completion of an offence, and to 
some extent its attempt, it has now become the preferred tool to intervene in cases of preparatory 
or facilitatory conduct or even mere risk-involving behaviour.1 The proliferation of laws that target 
remote harms is seen as “a fundamental evolution of the criminal law system”,2 but is at the same 
time criticised by scholars.3 This development manifests itself in multiple domains, but especially 
in the context of counter-terrorism.4 The “offences related to terrorist activities”5 vary from 
membership offences, incitement offences, to travelling offences. These offences have received 
much attention, given the fact that they often restrict our fundamental rights and freedoms.  
This contribution aims to highlight one fundamental right in particular, namely the right to seek, 
receive, and impart information and ideas. This right is incorporated in the unanimously recognised 
right to freedom of expression.6 Given the fact that this freedom of information is not an absolute 
 
1 K.S. Stubbs and F. Galli, ‘Inchoate Offences: The Sanctioning of an Act Prior to and Irrespective of the Commission 
of Any Harm’, in F. Galli and A. Weyembergh, eds., EU Counter-Terrorism Offences: What Impact on National 
Legislation and Case-Law? (Brussels: Editions de L'Université de Bruxelles, 2012) pp. 291-303. 
2 See for example in Belgium: Amendement van 7 juli 2016 bij het wetsvoorstel tot wijziging van het Strafwetboek wat 
betreft de bestraffing van terrorisme, Parl.St. Kamer 2015-16, nr. 54 1579/005, p.6. 
3 See R.V. Ericson, ‘The State of Preemption: Managing Terrorism Risk through Counter Law’, in L. Amoore and M. 
De Goede, eds., Risk and the War on Terror, (New York: Routledge, 2008) pp. 57-76; D.W. Fitzgibbon, ‘Institutional 
Racism, Pre-Emptive Criminalisation and Risk Analysis’, 46(2) The Howard Journal (2007) 128-44; H.M. Lomell, 
‘Punishing the Uncommitted Crime: Prevention, Pre-Emption, Precaution and the Transformation of Criminal Law’, 
in S. Ugelvik and B. Hudson, eds., Justice and Security in the 21st Century: Risks, Rights and the Rule of Law (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2012) pp. 83-100; J. McCulloch and S. Pickering, ‘Pre-Crime and Counter-Terrorism’, 49 British Journal 
of Criminology (2009), 628-45; J. McCulloch and D. Wilson, Pre-Crime: Preemption, Precaution and the Future 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2015); C. Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption and the Rule of 
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2012); K.S. Stubbs and F. Galli, op. cit.; M. van der Woude, Wetgeving in een Veiligheidscultuur: 
Totstandkoming van Antiterrorismewetgeving in Nederland Bezien vanuit Maatschappelijke en (Rechts)Politieke 
Context (Leiden University, 2010); L. Zedner, ‘Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology?’, 11 Theoretical Criminology (2007) 
261-81. 
4 See, inter alia, M. Hill QC and C. Walker, 'Counter Terrorism and Border Security Bill: Submission in Relation to 
Clause 3' (2018). 
5 On the level of the European Union, this categorisation is used in Directive 2017/541 under Title III. See Directive 
(EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, OJ L 88/6 (entered into 
force 20 April 2017) (further: Directive 2017/541 or the Directive).  
6 In addition to the right to seek, receive and impart information, this fundamental freedom entails the right to hold 
opinions without interference and the right to express, or disseminate, information and ideas. For a similar study on 
the latter component, see S. De Coensel, ‘Incitement to Terrorism: The Nexus between Causality & Intent and the 
Question of Legitimacy’, in C. Paulussen and M. Scheinin, Human Dignity and Human Security in Times of Terrorism 
 
 
right, certain limitations are allowed in accordance to the restriction clauses foreseen in the human 
rights instruments. Both on a supranational and domestic level, various information-related 
criminal offences have been formulated in the fight against terrorism and have developed in scope 
over time. For the purposes of this contribution, the focus will be on the phenomenon of self-study 
and the broader conduct of obtaining or viewing terrorist material over the internet. The relevant 
criminal law provisions will be studied on the level of the Council of Europe, the European Union, 
and four European domestic legal frameworks (i.e. Belgium, the Netherlands, France and the 
United Kingdom).7 
Academia has primarily focussed on existing policies regarding prevention strategies, 
surveillance,8 blocking or removal of online content,9 etc., and concentrates on substantive criminal 
law to a far lesser extent. Especially the criminal liability of the information consumer, rather than 
the distributor or publisher thereof, is more scarcely covered in legal doctrine and jurisprudence.10 
Moreover, a comparative approach on this topic has been absent in the literature. This research gap 
generates the need to investigate the legitimacy of consumer-oriented information-related offences, 
 
(The Hague: Asser Press, 2019) 269-98. The legal basis of the right can be found in the following instruments: 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 
November 1950, ETS 5 (entered into force 3 September 1953) (further: ECHR), art. 10; UN General Assembly, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, 217 A (III); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), art. 19.2; 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02 (26 October 2012), art. 11. See also United 
Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, ‘Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression 
and Countering Violent Extremism’ (3 May 2016), general principles (1.a.). 
7 See for a justification of the selection of these countries: section 2.1. (infra). 
8 See for example I. Brown and D. Korff, 'Terrorism and the Proportionality of Internet Surveillance', 6(2) European 
Journal of Criminology (2009). 
9 Terrorist content online is a topic high on the political agenda. In the EU Directive 2017/541, an article was 
inserted on measures against public provocation content online. In the same year, the European Commission 
launched a communication giving guidelines and principles on prevention, detection and removal of illegal 
content online. In March 2018, the Commission adopted a recommendation with non-binding operational 
measures. Nevertheless, the European Commission decided to go further and proposed a new regulation with 
legally binding measures concerning terrorist content (more in particular: removal orders, referrals and proactive 
measures), which is currently negotiated. In these instruments, a similar shift can be found to intervene in earlier 
stages by, for example, broadening the meaning of ‘terrorist content’. Although these instruments are not addressed 
within the scope of this article, they are important to understand the current evolutions. See Directive 2017/541, op. 
cit., art. 21; Communication of the European Commission and the Commission Recommendations: Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on Tackling Illegal Content Online: Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online 
Platforms, COM(2017) 555 final (28 September 2017); Commission Recommendation on measures to effectively 
tackle illegal content online, C(2018) 1177 final (1 March 2018); Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online, COM (2018) 640 final (12 September 
2018).  
10 The main exception in this context is the offence of “knowingly obtaining access to child pornography”, as 
introduced by art. 20, 1 (f) of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, adopted on 12 July 2007, CETS no. 201 (entered into force 1 July 2010) and by art. 5, 
3 of Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the 
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2004/68/JHA, OJ L 335/1. 
 
 
especially given the speediness of the changes in this field.11 This contribution, therefore, aims to 
subject these consumer-oriented information-related offences to a legitimacy test, measured by a 
remote harm analysis, a human rights assessment, and a necessity argument. Privacy-related issues 
will not be covered within the scope of this contribution.  
This paper argues that the legitimacy of criminal law provisions on the consumption of terrorist 
material over the internet comes under threat. Section 2 presents a justification for the selection of 
the four Western-European countries and a schematic overview of the relevant criminal law 
provisions, of which the legitimacy is analysed in-depth under section 3. This third section focuses 
on a remote harm analysis, a human rights assessment and a necessity argument. The paper ends 
with a critical conclusion in section 4, which argues that in order for legislation to be legitimate, a 
criminal law provision must be strictly construed and the constitutive elements of actus reus and 
mens rea must guarantee the blameworthiness of the conduct. As a result, there must be a sufficient 
level of active conduct, the substance of the online content must be limited to practical assistance 
and the act must be conducted for the purposes of committing a terrorist offence. These 
recommendations aim to adhere to the harm principle, to assure the democratic necessity of a 
limitation of the fundamental freedom of information, and to reflect on the necessity of criminal 
means.  
 
2.  OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1.  Justification selected countries 
This research paper focusses on the legal framework of Belgium, the Netherlands, France and the 
United Kingdom. A delineation to these four countries is the result of an analysis of the EU 
Terrorism Situation & Trend Reports, which showed that Belgium, the Netherlands, France and 
the United Kingdom rank rather high concerning (1) the number of arrests; (2) the number of 
individuals in concluded court proceedings for a terrorist offence; and (3) the number of verdicts. 
For the same reasons, other countries, such as Italy, Germany and Spain, could also be included in 
the analysis, but it was a deliberate choice to exclude these based on the fact that (1) the author is 
educated in Belgian law and has the knowledge of the Dutch, French and English language; and 
(2) an analysis of more than four countries would exceed the scope of this article. The four selected 
countries present a diverse picture regarding historical background in terrorist threats and legal 
framework pre- and post-9/11. Given that the United Kingdom and France have faced a 
significantly higher number of incidents in the twentieth century compared to Belgium and the 
Netherlands, their legal framework regarding terrorism was installed at a much earlier point in time. 
In Belgium and the Netherlands, terrorism as a separate offence type was only introduced following 
the EU Framework Decision of 2002. This diversity is an interesting element, which becomes also 
 
11 The increasing threat of lone wolves is a worrisome evolution that has caused policymakers to take new steps and 
broaden their legal frameworks. This is clearly evident in EU Directive 2017/541, which introduces a new provision 
on receiving training for terrorist purposes – including self-study – for the aim of addressing “the threats resulting from 
those actively preparing for the commission of terrorist offences, including those ultimately acting alone” (see recital 
11). This evolution is also clearly present at a national level, which will be extensively addressed in this paper. The 
heightened attention on terrorist content online is not only evident on the level of substantive criminal law, but also 
through other means (see footnote 9). These evolutions in the past few years make it necessary to evaluate the policy 
choices made and to formulate some recommendations for legitimate legislation in the future. 
 
 
evident in the context of terrorism-related offences, and more specifically in the context of 
consuming terrorism-related information over the internet. This article will show that the legal 
framework of the United Kingdom and France is much broader, whilst the Netherlands and 
especially Belgium more closely align the EU minimum standards. 
 
2.2.  Schematic overview of the relevant criminal law provisions  
Before turning to the legitimacy test, the most intrusive criminal law provisions that target self-
study (primarily through offences related to receiving terrorist training) and obtaining or viewing 
terrorist material over the internet are schematically summarised for the purpose of clarity. More 
generic offences on preparatory acts are not incorporated within the study, although they might 
cover said conduct. Afterwards, the most crucial elements of these provisions will be critically 
analysed. 
 
Legal system Legal basis Year of 
introduction 
Brief overview content 
Council of 
Europe 
Art. 3 Additional 
Protocol 
Convention on the 
Prevention of 
Terrorism12 
2015 Receiving training for terrorism “from 




Recital 11 juncto 
art. 8 Directive 
2017/54113 
2017 Receiving training for terrorism, including 
self-study. 






Receiving training for terrorism: previous 
formulation suggested a concrete relationship 
between trainer and trainee.14 This resulted in 
an amendment in 2019, which made self-
study punishable.15 
/ 2017 Idea of an autonomous criminalisation of the 
consultation of online material that incites 
terrorism was raised by the federal 
prosecutor; rejected by the parliamentary 
 
12 Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, opened for signature 22 
October 2015, CETS 217 (entered into force 1 July 2017). 
13 Directive 2017/541, op. cit., recital 11 juncto art. 8. 
14 See A. Fransen and J. Kerkhofs, ‘Het Materieel Terrorismestrafrecht’, in J. Kerkhofs, A. Schotsaert, and P. Van 
Linthout, eds., Contra-Terrorisme: De Gerechtelijke Aanpak van Terrorisme in België (Brussel: Larcier, 2018) 3-98.  
15 Belgium, Wet van 5 mei 2019 houdende diverse bepalingen in strafzaken en inzake erediensten, en tot wijziging van 
de wet van 28 mei 2002 betreffende de euthanasie en van het Sociaal Strafwetboek, BS 24 May 2019, 50023, art. 79, 
2° (further: DB II). See also S. De Coensel, 'De Wet Diverse Bepalingen in Strafzaken II: Terroristische Misdrijven in 
Lijn Met De Europese Verplichtingen?', 40(3) Panopticon (2019). 
 
 
committee of inquiry (which was installed 






2009 Receiving training for terrorism; terminology 
does not stand in the way of criminalising 
self-study. 
France Art. 421-2-6 Code 
pénal (CP) 
2014 “Entreprise individuelle”, covering the 
conduct of receiving training for terrorism 
and habitually consulting public 
communication services or holding 
documents that directly provoke or glorify 
the commission of terrorist acts (when in 
conjunction with other constitutive 
elements).17 
Art. 421-2-5-2 
Code pénal (CP) 
(annulled, see 
below) 
2016; 2017 Habitually accessing online public 
communication services that exhibit 
messages, images or representations that 
directly encourage the commission of 
terrorist acts, or defend these acts. 
The United 
Kingdom 




2000 Receiving weapons training. 




2006 Receiving training for terrorism: terminology 
does not stand in the way of criminalising 
self-study (but other provisions may be of 
more value in this context). 
 
16 See VRT News, 'Procureur Van Leeuw: "Bestraf mogelijke terroristen die jihad-propaganda zoeken' (2017); 
Parlementaire Onderzoekscommissie Terroristische Aanslagen, 'Parlementair onderzoek namens de Parlementaire 
Onderzoekscommissie belast met het onderzoek naar de omstandigheden die hebben geleid tot de terroristische 
aanslagen van 22 maart 2016 in de luchthaven Brussel-Nationaal en in het metrostation Maalbeek te Brussel, met 
inbegrip van de evolutie en de aanpak van de strijd tegen het radicalisme en de terroristische dreiging: Vierde 
tussentijds verslag over het onderdeel “Radicalisme”' (2017); De Morgen, 'Bezoeken van jihadistische websites toch 
niet strafbaar' (2017). 
17 This provision is widely criticised by scholars due to its complexity: C. Mauro, 'Une nouvelle loi contre le terrorisme: 
Quelles innovations? À propos de la loi n° 2014-1353 du 13 novembre 2014', 48 La Semaine juridique – Édition 
générale (2014); H. Rouidi, 'La loi n° 2014-1353 du 13 novembre 2014 renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte 
contre le terrorisme: Quelles évolutions?', AJ Pénal  (2014); S. Detraz, 'Le délit de préparation d'une infraction en lien 
avec une entreprise individuelle terroriste', 55 Gazette du Palais (2015); C. Lazerges and H. Henrion-Stoffel, 'Le déclin 
du droit pénal: L'émergence d'une politique criminelle de l'ennemi', RSC  (2016); N. Catelan and J-B. Perrier, 
'L'entreprise individuelle et les axiomes du Conseil Constitutionnel', 20 Recueil Dalloz (2017). 
 
 




2000 Possession for terrorist purposes. 







Collecting, making, possessing, viewing or 
otherwise accessing (by means of the 
internet) information of a kind likely to be 
useful for terrorism. 
 
3.  LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy is a complex notion, that for the purposes of this contribution is used as an evaluative 
concept. Legitimacy is understood in a normative sense, which entails that well-developed 
principles and values should lie at the basis of criminalisation policy.18 Whilst existing research 
has presented multiple variations on a normative theory on criminalisation,19 this paper focuses 
solely on the following aspects: a remote harm analysis, a human rights assessment and a necessity 
argumentation.20 As a result, there are three sub research questions that are answered within this 
legitimacy test: (1) to what extent is the harm principle the leading ground for criminalisation? (i.e. 
a remote harm analysis in section 3.1.); (2) to what extent is a criminal law approach in accordance 
with human rights standards? (i.e. a human rights assessment in section 3.2); and (3) to what extent 





18 See N. Persak, Legitimacy and Trust in Criminal Law, Policy and Justice: Norms, Procedures, Outcomes (New 
York: Routledge, 2014) p. 3 and 180. 
19 See, inter alia, T. De Roos, Strafbaarstelling Van Economische Delicten: Een Crimineel-Politieke Studie (Arnhem: 
Gouda Quint, 1987); J. Schonsheck, On Criminalization (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994); A. 
Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’, 116(2) Law Quarterly Review (2000): 14 et seq.; N. Jareborg, 
‘Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio)’, 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2005); D. Husak, 
Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); European Criminal 
Policy Initiative (ECPI), ‘The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy’, 1(1) European Criminal Law Review (2011), 
86-103; A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs. On the Principles of Criminalisation (Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2011); N. Persak, ‘EU Criminal Law and Its Legitimation: In Search for a Substantive Principle of 
Criminalisation’, 26 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2018): 20-39. 
20 These research delineations draw partly from the filtering model of Persak (based upon Schönsheck), which consists 
of (1) a filter on the main substantive criminalisation principle; (2) a filter on normative limiting factors; and (3) a filter 
on pragmatic limiting factors. See N. Persak, Criminalising Harmful Conduct : The Harm Principle, Its Limits and 
Continental Counterparts (New York: Springer, 2007); N. Persak, Legitimacy and Trust in Criminal Law, Policy and 
Justice: Norms, Procedures, Outcomes (New York: Routledge, 2014); N. Persak, ‘EU Criminal Law and Its 
Legitimation: In Search for a Substantive Principle of Criminalisation’, 26 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 




3.1.  Remote harm analysis: Harm as the leading ground for criminalisation?  
Criminal law is “the most intrusive means available to the legislator”.21 In order to clarify “what 
sort of human conduct, and for what reasons or under which conditions, it is legitimate to 
criminalize (and consequently punish) (…)”,22 legal theorists have searched for sound grounds for 
(or principles of) criminalisation. Four main “liberty-limiting principles”23 can be distinguished in 
the literature, namely the harm principle, the offence principle, legal paternalism and legal 
moralism.24 Considering that the preparatory works of all instruments make clear that the 
underlying reasoning of the criminal law provisions is the prevention of the potential commission 
of a terrorist act, and thus the prevention of harm, this contribution will solely focus on this ground 
of criminalisation.25 
 
3.1.1.  The issue of remote harms 
Given that the conduct of self-study, obtaining or viewing material over the internet only gives rise 
to a danger that the harm may be inflicted in the future, the issue raised is one of “remote harms”.26 
The legislation can be categorised as a “mediating intervention”, in which the proscribed conduct 
“has no ill consequences in itself, but which is thought to induce or lead to further acts (by the 
 
21 S. Melander, ‘Ultima Ratio in European Criminal Law’, 3(1) Onati Socio legal series (2013) 49. 
22 N. Persak, ‘Norms, Harms and Disorder at the Border: Legitimacy of Criminal Law Intervention through the Lens 
of Criminalisation Theory’, in N. Persak, Legitimacy and Trust in Criminal Law, Policy and Justice: Norms, 
Procedures, Outcomes (New York: Routledge, 2014) p. 13. 
23 Terminology of Joel Feinberg, who has made a major contribution in this context with his famous tetralogy on the 
grounds of criminalisation: J. Feinberg, Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); J. Feinberg, 
Harm to Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); J. Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988); J. Feinberg, Offense to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
24 Especially legal paternalism and legal moralism may play a role in the context of consuming terrorism-related 
content over the internet. Legal paternalism might provide for a reason for criminalisation when it prevents harm to 
the actor himself. Existing research has established that watching gruesome content can profoundly impact the psyche 
of an individual and influence the neuro-agency of that person (e.g. desensitising effects and mass indifference). See 
W. Noble, ‘Something You Wish You Had Never Seen – Videos of Death & Murder on Facebook, YouTube and Other 
Media Platforms’, in T. Owen, W. Noble and F. Christabel Speed, eds., New Perspectives on Cybercrime, (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). Proponents of legal moralism could also claim that immorality is a sufficient reason for 
criminalising certain conduct. However, from a liberal predisposition, legal paternalism and legal moralism may 
present relevant reasons for criminalisation, but these grounds do not constitute a sufficient and decisive reason. 
25 The origin of the existence of the harm principle goes back to Mill who introduced the principle first as the Principle 
of Liberty: J.S. Mill, On Liberty (London: John W. Parker and son, 1859). The harm principle is considered the most 
widely recognised among the grounds of criminalisation. See N. Peršak, Criminalising Harmful Conduct: The Harm 
Principle, its Limits and Continental Counterparts (New York: Springer, 2007). 
26 For more information on (remote) harms, see: A. von Hirsch, ‘Extending the Harm Principle: 'Remote' Harms and 
Fair Imputation’, in A.P. Simester and A.T.H. Smith, Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); A.P. 
Simester and A. von Hirsch, ‘Remote Harms and Non-constitutive Crimes’, 28(1) Criminal Justice Ethics (2009); A.P. 
Simester and A. von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs. On the Principles of Criminalisation (Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2011); J. ten Voorde, ‘Prohibiting Remote Harms: On Endangerment, Citizenship and Control’, 10(1) 
Utrecht Law Review (2014); R.A. Duff and S.E. Marshall, ‘Abstract Endangerment, Two Harm Principles, and Two 
Routes to Criminalisation’, 3(2) Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2015). See more generally on 
prevention and criminalization: A. Ashworth and L. Zedner, ‘Prevention and Criminalization: Justifications and 
Limits’, 15 New Criminal Law Review (2012). 
 
 
defendant or a third person) that create or risk harm”.27 The consultation of a certain website or the 
possession of a manual is in itself without danger, but the further acting upon the knowledge found 
in these manuals may lead to the commission of a terrorist attack. It may be clear that the envisaged 
conduct can be considered as an externalisation of a subjective view of endangerment, namely that 
the dangerousness of the conduct depends on the intent of the actor, even without the act itself 
being objectively dangerous.28 
A frequently used tool to assess whether a given type of risk satisfies the requirements of the harm 
principle, is the ‘Standard Harm Analysis’ (SHA).29 The SHA provides for three main 
considerations, namely (1) the gravity of the eventual harm, and its likelihood; (2) the social value 
of the conduct, and the degree of intrusion upon actors’ choices that criminalisation would involve; 
and (3) certain side-constraints that would preclude criminalisation. Although this common 
approach is sufficient for analysing immediate harms, further principles are necessary in order to 
adequately address the issues surrounding remote harms. Simester and von Hirsch (2011) have, 
therefore, developed an ‘Extended Harm Analysis’ (EHA). In addition to the empirical link 
between the prohibited conduct and the undesired harmful result (step 1 SHA), a normative link 
becomes essential - which focuses on the questions “why and to what extent the defendant 
committing a given act should be held responsible or to blame for its remote consequences or risks” 
(i.e. fair imputation).30 This section will first examine the existing laws and the incorporation of 
the terrorist link, after which existing research on the empirical link will be explored. The section 
will end with a critical note on the normative link.  The second and third step of the SHA, namely 
the social value of the conduct, the degree of intrusion upon actors’ choices that criminalisation 
would involve, and the side-constraints, refer mainly to the infringement of fundamental freedoms.  
These elements are, therefore, given a central place in the human rights assessment (infra, section 
3.2.).  
 
3.1.2.  The terrorist link in the existing criminal law provisions 
Following courses online (e.g. chemistry courses), searching information on the internet, viewing 
online content and downloading certain material is in itself harmless and lawful. However, this 
conduct turns into unlawful behaviour when there is a terrorist link. This link differs from provision 
to provision. It will be demonstrated that the crime descriptions have been increasingly stretched, 
leading to the criminalisation of conduct that is even further removed from the actual harm.  
The minimum standard of the European Union with regard to self-study (as incorporated in the 
offence of receiving training for terrorism) calls upon Member States to criminalise conduct that is 
executed “for the purpose of committing, or contributing to the commission of” a terrorist offence 
 
27 A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch (2011), op. cit., p. 58. 
28 J. ten Voorde, ‘Prohibiting Remote Harms: On Endangerment, Citizenship and Control’, 10(1) Utrecht Law Review 
(2014) 168. 
29 Simester and von Hirsch have labelled the common approach to analyse direct, primary harms the ‘Standard Harm 
Analysis’. However, they argue that there is a need for an ‘Extended Harm Analysis’ to deal with the special issues 
raised by remote harms. See A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch (2011), op. cit., p. 53 et seq.  
30 A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch (2011), op. cit., p. 56. 
 
 
“when committed intentionally” (art. 8 Directive 2017/541).31 The domestic legal frameworks do 
not explicitly refer to self-study within their crime descriptions of receiving terrorism for terrorist 
purposes. However, the conduct will often be prohibited in an implicit way, or through other 
criminal law provisions. The broadening to include contributions to the commission of a terrorist 
offence enlarges the scope of the offences significantly. The conduct of self-study, viewing or 
obtaining material over the internet is in itself considered to be an act preparatory to terrorism. 
When this preparatory conduct is not only for the purpose of actually committing a terrorist offence, 
but also for the purpose of contributing to a terrorist offence (i.e. other preparatory acts), these 
provisions can be seen as “double preparation offences”,32 of which the ancillary offences may 
again be considered a crime.33 Ten Voorde (2012) cites in this context examples such as language 
courses, the training in writing inflammatory speeches and in the ability to express threats.34 By 
combining multiple offences with each other and with ancillary offences, there is a risk that the 
threshold of punishable conduct lies at a very early stage far removed from the actual terrorist 
offence. Moreover, even though there is a requirement of intent, the threshold is rather low. This 
intent can, for example, be inferred from “the type of materials and frequency of reference”35 or 
“what is known about the background of the suspected person”, such as “information known about 
the suspect’s hatred of the Western world, his fascination with terrorist violence or about the 
person’s radicalisation process”.36 Ten Voorde (2014) warns that “too much focus on intent could 
lead to the criminalization of one’s political, societal or religious background, or the orientation of 
the offender”.37 Such an interpretation of intent is a dangerous one, which should be avoided at all 
times.  
Whereas in the case of self-study the terrorist link has clearly been stretched, some provisions are 
formulated in a manner implying a lower threshold or not even demanding a terrorist purpose at 
all.  
 
31 On an EU level, the evolution concerning training offences is remarkable. In 2002, the cornerstone instrument of the 
criminal justice response to counter terrorism (Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA), did not make mention of 
any training offence. In 2008, the latter instrument was amended and the provision on providing training for terrorism 
was introduced (Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA). Almost a decade later, Directive 2017/541 replaces 
these Framework Decisions and has added ‘receiving training for terrorism’ to the list of punishable behaviour. 
Although self-study was not incorporated in the initial proposal, it is explicitly included in the recital of the final 
Directive.  
32 J.M. ten Voorde, 'Het Deelnemen en Meewerken aan Training voor Terrorisme Getoetst aan Criteria voor 
Strafbaarstelling in de Voorfase', 42(2) Delikt en delinkwent (2012) p. 106. 
33 The Meijers Committee (2016) has also criticised the addition of ‘contributing’. See Meijers Committee, 'Note on a 
Proposal for a Directive on Combating Terrorism’ (2016).  
34 J.M. ten Voorde, op.cit., p. 108-09. 
35 Directive 2017/541, recital 11.  
36 Translation of The Netherlands, Wetsvoorstel wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht, Wetboek van Strafvordering 
en enkele aanverwante wetten in verband met de strafbaarstelling van het deelnemen en meewerken aan training voor 
terrorisme, uitbreiding van de mogelijkheden tot ontzetting uit het beroep als bijkomende straf en enkele andere 
wijzigingen, Tweede Kamer 2007–08, Kamerstuk 31 386, nr. 8, Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag, p. 6. J.M. ten 
Voorde (2012) (op. cit.) warns that certain groups of the population might be targeted by this specification. He, 
therefore, pleads for a strict interpretation by the Courts. 
37 J. ten Voorde, ‘Prohibiting Remote Harms: On Endangerment, Citizenship and Control’, 10(1) Utrecht Law Review 
(2014), p. 176. 
 
 
In the UK, two parallel38 provisions on collecting, making or possessing material both entail a 
different standard. According to section 57 of the Terrorism Act 2000, “a person commits an 
offence if he possesses an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that 
his possession is for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act 
of terrorism”. Section 58 of the same act, however, punishes a person if he (a) collects or makes a 
record, (b) possesses a document or record, or (c) views, or otherwise accesses, by means of the 
internet a document or record, “of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an 
act of terrorism”. This third element (c) was recently inserted by the Counter-Terrorism and Border 
Security Act in 2019.39 However, the standard “of a kind likely to be useful” says nothing about the 
terrorist intent of the perpetrator. Although the House of Lords held prior to this amendment that 
the information must be of “practical assistance”,40 human rights organisations are rightly 
concerned that the formulation itself is too ambiguous and that mere propaganda videos would also 
fall within its scope. Even though the newly amended article contains a defence clause for those 
with a “reasonable excuse” (s.58, 3), this does not rule out the conviction of a person with no 
terrorist intent.41 The absence of a link between the defence and a terrorist intent is demonstrated 
by the fact that the Crown Prosecution Service “does not take the view that mere curiosity will 
always be a reasonable excuse”.42 Nevertheless, it is not because someone knows that the content 
of a website is of a terrorist nature, that he has a terrorist intent.43 As Professor Emeritus Walker 
(2018) rightly states, “every citizen might have research purposes”.44 Moreover, the reversed 
burden of proof “runs afoul of the fundamental principle that the main burden of proof should 
reside with the prosecution”.45  
 
38 For example, in Siddique v. Her Majesty’s Advocate, it was argued that the charge under s.58 was an alternative to 
the charge under s.57. In other words, a conviction under s.57 did not require to consider and return a verdict on a 
charge under s.58 (Mohammed Atif Siddique v. Her Majesty's Advocate, 29 January 2010, [2010] HCJAC 7). See A.  
du Bois-Pedain, 'Terrorist Possession Offences: Curiosity Kills the Cat?', 68(2) The Cambridge Law Journal (2009). 
and J. Hodgson and V. Tadros, 'How to Make a Terrorist out of Nothing', 72(6) Modern Law Review (2009). These 
authors have openly criticised these sections. The focus will be on s.58 (although s.57 may also be applicable in some 
cases). 
39 Although the offence has been the subject of much debate before and after its amendment, it must be noted that the 
more general preparation offence of section 5 of TACT 2006 has been used more often.  
40 See United Kingdom, R v. G and J, 4 March 2009, [2009] UKHL 13, para. 43. This ‘practical use test’ consequently 
leads to the fact that a document that “simply encourages the commission of acts of terrorism does not fall within the 
ambit of the section” (see B. Middleton, 'Terrorism-Related Documents: Defining the Ambit of S.58 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000', 72(2) J. Crim. L. (2008)). Hodgson and Tadros (2009) (op. cit.), however, argue that in R v. G ([2009] 
UKHL13) the Court failed to give the section a suitably constrained meaning. 
41 Especially since the House of Lords has argued that “to have a defence, the defendant must have had an objectively 
reasonable excuse for collecting the information”, overruling the previous standard “that a reasonable excuse is ‘simply 
an explanation that the document or record is possessed for a purpose other than to assist in the commission or 
preparation of an act of terrorism’”. See the United Kingdom, R v. K, [2008] EWCA Crim 185 and the United Kingdom, 
House of Lords, 4 March 2009, ([2009] UKHL 13. 
42 Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, ‘Report on the Operation in 2010 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of 
Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006’ (July 2011), p.89. 
43 Liberty, 'Liberty’s Briefing on the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill for Second Reading in the House of 
Lords' (2018), p. 10. 
44 C. Walker, 'Written Evidence  (Cbs0001) in Response to the Joint Committee on Human Right’s Call for Evidence 
in Connection with the Counter Terrorism & Border Security Bill 2017-19' (2018), p. 12. 
45 M. Hill QC and C. Walker, op. cit., para. 2(c). 
 
 
In France, art. 421-2-5-2 CP punished “the act of habitually accessing online public communication 
services that exhibit messages, images or representations that directly encourage the commission 
of terrorist acts, or defend these acts, when this service has the purpose of showing images or 
representations of these acts that consist of voluntary harm to life”.46 This provision did not contain 
a single demand of a terrorist intent nor proof whether the defendant embraces the particular 
ideology, prior to its first annulment.47 The French legislator later added the latter requirement, but 
the Conseil constitutionnel again ruled that this was not sufficient and that a terrorist intent was 
still lacking.48 Moreover, the scope of the “bonne foi” defence was considered insufficiently 
precise. 
 
3.1.3.  The empirical link between the conduct and the undesired harmful result 
The gravity of the potential eventual harm, namely the commission of a terrorist act, is of such a 
magnitude that counter-terrorism measures often escape scrutiny by the legislator in the name of 
security. However, not only the gravity must be taken into account, but also the likelihood that the 
harm will be caused. Scientific research on the empirical link between the prohibited conduct (i.e. 
self-study, obtaining or viewing certain terrorism-related content over the internet) and the 
undesired harmful result (i.e. a terrorist attack) shows some interesting – but also very divergent – 
findings.  Although scholars are still divided on the extent and practical significance of the internet, 
there is little doubt on the fact that the internet is commonly used for terrorist purposes.49Another 
point of agreement is that “radicalisation of opinion” should be separated from “radicalisation of 
action”.50  Due to the wide array of prohibited conduct under the studied provisions, it is useful to 
make a distinction between (a) seeking actual manuals and other information that provide practical 
assistance in the preparation of a terrorist offence, and (b) accessing websites that provide inciting 
propaganda texts, images and videos or viewing/obtaining certain material (no practical assistance, 
e.g. language courses or religious content).  
Concerning practical information, a study of lone actors has shown that almost half of the sample 
of Al-Qaeda related lone actors learned through virtual sources and held bomb-making manuals 
 
46 France, Loi n° 2016-731 du 3 juin 2016 renforçant la lutte contre le crime organisé, le terrorisme et leur financement, 
et améliorant l'efficacité et les garanties de la procédure pénale, JORF no. 0129, 4 June 2016, art. 18 : « Le fait de 
consulter habituellement un service de communication au public en ligne mettant à disposition des messages, images 
ou représentations soit provoquant directement à la commission d'actes de terrorisme, soit faisant l'apologie de ces 
actes lorsque, à cette fin, ce service comporte des images ou représentations montrant la commission de tels actes 
consistant en des atteintes volontaires à la vie (…) » . This provision is confined to images or representations showing 
“des atteintes volontaires à la vie”, which is a specific category of crimes in the French Penal Code entailing “meurtre”, 
“l’assassinat” (i.e. premeditated murder), and “l’empoisonnement” (i.e. poisoning). The death of the victim is the 
distinguishing criterion between attacks on life and attacks on the integrity of the person. 
47 France, Conseil constitutionnel, no. 2016-611 QPC, 10 February 2017, para. 14. 
48 France, Conseil constitutionnel, no. 2017-682 QPC, 15 December 2017, para. 14. 
49 T. Zeman, J. Bren, and R. Urban, ‘Role of Internet in lone wolf terrorism’, 7(2) Journal of Security and Sustainability 
Issues (2017). 
50 C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, ‘Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model’, 72(3) 
American Psychologist (2017) 205-16. 
 
 
within their homes.51 Notwithstanding these high figures, other scholars question the significance 
of information on the internet, either on the basis of the poor quality or inaccuracies or on the basis 
of the simple fact that some skills demand practical experience.52 Zeman, Břeň and Urban (2017) 
even conclude that “the significance of the internet as a communication tool in the transfer of 
practical information or in the planning of a terrorist attack seems to be at least marginal”.53 Instead, 
these authors have found in their review on the role of the internet in lone wolf terrorism that the 
internet rather plays a crucial role in transferring theoretical information or changing ideological 
perspectives.54  
When it comes to propaganda, research has shown that there is a wide spectrum of people exposed 
to the propaganda machine, whilst only a very small proportion proceeds to action.55 In the survey 
of Cunliffe and Cottee (2017), 57% of the young adult respondents has watched an IS video before 
(beyond TV clips and online news material), and 46% of the latter category has even seen more 
than 10 videos. From that perspective, it is astonishing that under UK law, criminal liability is 
triggered even from a single viewing. In spite of a lack of further empirical data, these scholars 
argue that “while sustained exposure to extremist online material is not in itself a sufficient cause 
of radicalization, it can reinforce existing assumptions and beliefs that are already tending toward 
the extreme”.56 In other words, effective propaganda catalyses the radicalisation process of those 
individuals who already hold extreme sympathies. Koch (2018), on the other hand, describes 
multiple cases in which beheading videos did have an influence on the actions of an individual, 
also outside the Jihadi context (i.e. copycat behaviour).57 
These results show that no unequivocal conclusions can be drawn on the likelihood of harm. There 
is a high need for further empirical data. Moreover, it is not always easy to draw a clear line 
between seeking practical information and other sources. Although these types of activities are 
distinctive in nature, many sources contain both propaganda and instructional content (e.g. online 
Jihadi magazines, such as IS’s Rumiyah). 
 
3.1.4.  The normative link: fair imputation 
The foregoing has made clear that the risk of harm does not arise straight away from the prohibited 
act. Instead, a further intervention or subsequent choice of the actor is required in order for the 
harm to arise. As Simester and von Hirsch (2011) note, this technique criminalises conduct that is 
not inherently wrong.58 The mere potential to lead to harm as a rationale for criminalisation 
undermines the idea of the actor “as a moral agent, capable of deliberation and self-control” (i.e. 
 
51 P. Gill, J. Horgan, and P. Deckert, ‘Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-
Actor Terrorists’, 59(2) Journal of Forensic Sciences (2014) p. 434. 
52 T. Zeman, J. Bren, and R. Urban, op. cit.; D.C. Benson,  ‘Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism’, 23 Security 
Studies (2014), 293–328; J. Mueller, M.G. Stewart, ‘Terrorism, counterterrorism, and the Internet: The American 
cases’, 8 Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict (2015), 176–190.  
53 T. Zeman, J. Bren, and R. Urban, op. cit., p. 187. 
54 T. Zeman, J. Bren, and R. Urban, op. cit. 
55 See S. Cottee, ‘Why Do We Want to Watch Gory Jihadist Propaganda Videos?’, in The New York Times (2017). 
56 S. Cottee, ‘Why Do We Want to Watch Gory Jihadist Propaganda Videos?’, in The New York Times (2017). 
57 Ariel Koch, ‘Jihadi Beheading Videos and Their Non-Jihadi Echoes’, 12(3) Perspectives on Terrorism (2018). 
58 A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch (2011), op. cit., p. 80. 
 
 
personal agency).59 In the case of a remote harm, it is therefore needed not only to investigate the 
empirical link, but also the normative link of fair imputation: “why and to what extent should the 
defendant committing a given act be held responsible or to blame for its remote consequences or 
risks”?60 This question differs from a purely empirical account of causality (supra, 3.1.3.) as well 
as from the traditional criminal law notions of fault and culpability (mens rea) (supra, 3.1.2.). It is 
quite possible that the prohibited conduct is done intentionally, but the question remains whether 
the potential ultimate consequences should be seen asthe responsibility of the actor. The answer 
may lie, in part, in the political and social obligations of a certain person. In other words, the reasons 
are ‘role-dependent’ and may relate to a social or economic role (e.g. a vendor, manufacturer, civil 
servant) or simply the responsibilities as a citizen that every person has.61  
Criminalising the consumer of online information might endanger this principle of fair imputation. 
A consumer does not act in a specific capacity or has no specific obligations.62 Given that there is 
no specific social role attributed to a consumer, one could ask whether consuming terrorism-related 
information is in violation of our general (political) duties as a citizen. However, Simester and von 
Hirsch (2011) stress that “grounds for imputation cannot be drawn straightforwardly from everyday 
morality”.63 Ten Voorde (2014) clarifies this concept of citizenship, by discussing two separate 
visions: a liberal and a republican vision on citizenship. He argues that “criminalizing remote harms 
can, from a liberal point of view, be allowed as long as those offences do not interfere too much 
with the freedom and independence of citizens, or, from a republican point of view, as long as 
criminalization is not based on or does not lead to distrust among citizens within the polity”.64 As 
a liberal proponent, this paper argues that when mens rea is not sufficiently taken into account, the 
preventive strategy is a too drastic interference in a citizen’s life. But even from a republican 
perspective, only a ‘public wrong’ may be criminalized.65 Whilst there is no doubt that actual 
preparatory conduct with the intention to commit a terrorist act transcends the level of morality and 
undoubtedly constitutes a ‘public wrong’, the same conclusion does not apply to broader offences 
(e.g. the UK and French provisions, supra).  
This section on remote harms has shown that legislators increasingly criminalise conduct while, at 
the same time, omit the needed safeguards regarding the ultimate harm (i.e. the terrorist link and 
the mens rea requirement). This is especially the case with the UK offence on collecting 
information and the annulled French provision on habitually accessing websites. Combined with 
the unequivocal findings regarding the empirical link between the conduct and the ultimate harm, 
 
59 A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch (2011), op. cit., p. 61, 62 and 81. 
60 A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch (2011), op. cit., p. 56. 
61 A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch (2011), op. cit., p. 64. See also J. Ten Voorde, ‘Prohibiting Remote Harms: On 
Endangerment, Citizenship and Control’, 10(1) Utrecht Law Review (2014). 
62 As Ten Voorde (2014, op. cit., p. 172) explains, “the content of social obligations can be found in written texts 
(protocols, guidelines or legislation), but can also take the form of unwritten obligations (principles of carefulness) and 
are directed at a person who acts in a certain capacity, such as a civil servant or employee (we could call these types 
of social obligations functional obligations), or someone who lacks that formal capacity, but who is held to certain 
social obligations because of the specific context within which he acts (e.g., any person who sells goods via the internet, 
whether as a professional or not, must act in accordance with certain social obligations).” 
63 A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch (2011), op. cit., p. 64. 
64 J. Ten Voorde, op. cit., p. 174. 
65 J. Ten Voorde, op. cit., p. 173. 
 
 
and the questionable imputation on the consumer of online information, the criminal law provisions 
do not always satisfy the requirements of the harm principle.  
 
3.2. Human rights assessment: Freedom of information breached? 
The second part of the legitimacy test answers the question to what extent a criminal law approach 
is in accordance with human rights standards? In the following subsections, it will be demonstrated 
that the internet plays a central role within the right to freedom of information and, as a 
consequence, all restrictions must be as limited as possible. Since the case law on consumer-
oriented criminal law provisions is scarce, an a fortiori argument based upon the criteria within the 
case law on the dissemination limb of freedom of expression is made.  
 
3.2.1.  Freedom of information and access to internet 
This paper focusses on the fundamental freedom of information, which is – inter alia –66 
incorporated in article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “Everyone has the right 
to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers 
(…)”. Although this right has primarily been interpreted as an intellectual right, it “has become one 
of the most important social rights since it is a precondition for participation in the various socio-
economic and political activities of a modern knowledge society”.67 Within the context of the 
criminal law interventions on self-study, obtaining and viewing terrorist material over the internet, 
it is the negative obligation under article 10 ECHR that is of importance. This negative obligation 
“prohibits a Government from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or 
may be willing to impart to him”.68 There is no doubt that the internet falls within the scope of 
 
66 See fn. 6. Although other instruments – such as the EU Charter – are also relevant in the debate, it is a deliberate 
choice to delineate this research paper solely to the European Convention/Court on Human Rights. This choice is 
motivated by the fact that, in the context of counter-terrorism, the European Court of Justice has primarily ruled upon 
executive decisions, terrorist lists and the restricting (economic) measures imposed upon designated individuals (‘smart 
sanctions’, mostly related to the freezing of assets) (see e.g. the Kadi cases). In the context of the free movement of 
information society services, it is the liability of service providers that has primarily been the subject of court rulings 
(see, inter alia, ECJ, Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited, C- 18/18, 3 October 2019). Although 
highly interesting subjects, a thorough study would go beyond the scope of the paper.  
67 P.J. Lor and J.J. Britz, 'Is a Knowledge Society Possible without Freedom of Access to Information?' 33(4) Journal 
of Information Science (2007) p. 388. 
68 ECtHR, Leander v. Sweden, no. 9248/81, 26 March 1987, para. 74. In addition to this negative obligation, freedom 
of information is often understood as the right of access to information held by public bodies. See Article 19, 'The 
Public’s Right to Know: Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation' (1999); P. Birkinshaw, Freedom of 
Information: The Law, the Practice and the Ideal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); T. Mendel, 
Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey (Paris: UNESCO, 2008). However, the European Court of 
Human Rights has been reluctant to recognise such general right of access to information held by public bodies. 
 
 
article 10.69 The European Court of Human Rights has stressed the importance of the internet for 
the freedom of information in its case law. 70, 71  
Restrictions must, therefore, be as limited as possible and must satisfy the three-step test of the 
Court (infra). Most cases deal with measures blocking access to the internet72 and the removal of 
defamatory blog posts and comments73. Concerning criminal liability, the cases before the Court 
have always been related to the publisher of certain content.74 Consequently, the criminal liability 
of the consumer who merely viewed or downloaded content has not yet been subjected to close 
scrutiny of the Court. The only exception was the case of Jobe v. The United Kingdom, in which 
the Court declared inadmissible a complaint on s. 58 of the terrorism Act 2000 under article 7 and 
10 of the Convention. The considerations of the Court under the article 10 complaint were very 
brief: 
“The Court considers that this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded. Even assuming that 
there was an interference with the applicant’s Article 10 rights, it was justified under Article 
10 § 2. For substantially the same reasons given in respect of Article 7 above, any 
interference was prescribed by law. It was clearly justified by the legitimate aims of the 
interests of national security and the prevention and disorder of crime. It was also necessary 
in a democratic society, particularly when section 58 did not criminalise in a blanket manner 
the collection or possession of material likely to be useful to a person committing or 
preparing an act of terrorism; it only criminalised collection or possession of that material 
without a reasonable excuse. In the Court’s view, this is an entirely fair balance to strike.”75 
This demonstrates that the Court is rather lenient in terrorism cases, and that there will hardly ever 
be an issue with regard to the first two steps of the limitation clause of article 10, namely the 
“prescribed by law” requirement and the legitimate aim of the interference. However, as Hill and 
Walker (2018) rightly state: “To date, the section 58 offence has been upheld as ECHR-compliant 
by domestic courts and even the ECtHR. Nevertheless, as the boundaries of the criminal law are 
expanded, so are the impingements on thought and expression and so are the arguments about legal 
(un)certainty”.76 The question arises to what extent the current (expanded) criminal law provisions 
on self-study, obtaining and viewing terrorist material over the internet would amount to a breach 
 
69 Research Division European Court of Human Rights, 'Internet: Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights' 
(2015), p. 40. 
70 ECtHR, Cengiz and others v. Turkey, nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, 1 December 2015, para. 49 and 52. 
71 The importance of the internet has also been reaffirmed on the level of the United Nations. Parallel to freedom of 
expression, the right of access to information must be embedded in a legal framework in which the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality are of central importance when dealing with restrictions. See UNESCO, Unesco’s 
Internet Universality Indicators: A Framework for Assessing Internet Development (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2019), p. 27. 
72 E.g. ECtHR, Yildirim v. Turkey, no. 3111/10, 18 December 2012; ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey, no. 20877/10, 11 
March 2014; ECtHR, Cengiz and others v. Turkey, nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, 1 December 2015 (respectively on 
the blocking of Google Sites, MySpace and Youtube). 
73 E.g. ECtHR, Delfi AS v. Estonia, no. 64569/09, 16 June 2015; ECtHR, PIHL v. Sweden, no. 74742/14, 7 February 
2017; ECtHR, Tamiz v. UK, no. 3877/14, 19 September 2017. 
74 See for example ECtHR, Perrin v. UK, no. 5446/03, 18 October 2005. 
75 ECtHR, Jobe v. UK, no. 48278/09, 14 June 2011 (further: Jobe v. UK). 
76 M. Hill QC and C. Walker, op. cit.  
 
 
of article 10. This question is especially relevant in terms of compliance with the third step of the 
limitation clause, namely whether the interference is necessary in a democratic society.  
 
3.2.2.  Necessity in a democratic society 
The democratic necessity test has been extensively developed under the freedom of expression 
limb of article 10 ECHR. The long-standing rule that even offending, shocking or disturbing 
content constitutes protected speech is among the most important elements in the Court’s 
jurisprudence.77 The assessment demands a fair balance between the general interest of the 
community and the interests of the individual,78 taking into account the criteria that have 
characterised the case law on freedom of expression. On the whole, these criteria are translated in 
the following elements: “who is invoking the right to freedom of expression, what was published, 
broadcasted or imparted, who was eventually criticized or insulted, how the opinions or statements 
were formulated or what medium was used, to whom the message was directed or who could 
receive the information, when something was published, broadcasted or imparted, where and under 
which circumstances something was made public, with what intention information was made 
public or allegations or opinions were formulated, and what the possible effect or impact of the 
message was”.79 Finally, the Court will also take into account the character of the interference and 
the severity of the sanctions.80  
A similar detailed standard is not yet developed under the freedom of information limb of article 
10 ECHR, especially not concerning the criminal liability of consumers of certain online content. 
However, given the detailed and traditional high standard in relation to the dissemination of certain 
content,81 it may – a fortiori – be assumed that an even higher standard is appropriate in the context 
of receiving that same content. At the very least, the same standard and contextual criteria (as cited 
above) should be used as guiding principles. The following paragraphs will, therefore, focus on the 
different criteria of the person subjected to the criminal law measure, the substance of the online 
content, the actus reus and the intent of the actor.   
  
3.2.2.1.  Person subjected to criminal law measure 
The first question, namely the who-question, concerns the person subjected to a criminal law 
measure. Whilst personal characteristics, such as the level of authority of the person, are of 
 
77 ECtHR, Handyside v. UK, no. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, para. 49. 
78 Research Division European Court of Human Rights, op. cit., p. 42. 
79 D. Voorhoof, 'Freedom of Expression, Media and Journalism under the European Human Rights System: 
Characteristics, Developments, and Challenges', in P. Molnar, ed., Free Speech and Censorship around the Globe, 
(Budapest - New York: Central European University Press, 2015), pp. 23-24. 
80 D. Voorhoof, 'Freedom of Expression, Media and Journalism under the European Human Rights System: 
Characteristics, Developments, and Challenges', in P. Molnar, ed., Free Speech and Censorship around the Globe, 
(Budapest - New York: Central European University Press, 2015), pp. 23-24. 
81 See D. Voorhoof, 'Freedom of Expression, Media and Journalism under the European Human Rights System: 
Characteristics, Developments, and Challenges', in P. Molnar, ed., Free Speech and Censorship around the Globe, 
(Budapest - New York: Central European University Press, 2015). However, as Voorhoof describes in his contribution, 
a worrying trend of less protection is emerging– which is also challenged in multiple dissenting opinions.  
 
 
importance in assessing the influence of their disseminated messages, this factor seems to be 
irrelevant in passively viewing or obtaining terrorism-related content. Every single consumer 
becomes the possible target of a criminal law measure, given that the terrorist link within these 
crime descriptions is stretched, weak or absent - resulting in a predominantly negative answer 
concerning the likelihood of harm. Nonetheless, research has repeatedly shown that “there is no 
clear production line from viewing extremism or even being ‘radicalised’ into becoming an active 
terrorist”.82 Efforts should, therefore, be “directed towards creators and publishers, including 
passive platforms such as social media” instead of “picking off individuals with disquieting tastes 
in internet materials which they indulge in isolation”.83 This approach would certainly be more 
effective, and would ensure that criminal liability is reserved for those who intentionally distribute 
terrorist material and that non-criminal means effectively target the spread of illegal online content. 
 
3.2.2.2.  Substance of the online content 
The exact content of the message (what?) depends upon the criminal law provision. With regard to 
self-study, the minimum standard of the EU is formulated as follows: “instructions on the making 
or use of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or on other 
specific methods or techniques” (art. 8 Directive 2017/541). Belgium, France and the United 
Kingdom have transposed this standard in similar terms in their provisions on receiving training 
for terrorist purposes (respectively art. 140quinquies juncto 140quater Sw., art. 421-2-6 I, 2°, b CP 
and s.54.2 TACT 2000 juncto s.6 TACT 2006), whereas the Netherlands uses the more vague and 
broader terms of “knowledge or skills” without further specifications (art. 134a Sr.). The annulled 
French provision on the habitually accessing certain websites is not aimed at instructions, but at 
“communication services that exhibit messages, images or representations that directly encourage 
the commission of terrorist acts, or defend these acts, when this service has the purpose of showing 
images or representations of these acts that consist of voluntary harm to life”. The prime example 
in this context is footage of a decapitation or similar propaganda material. The recently amended 
UK provision on the collection of information (s.58 TACT 2000), on the other hand, is less precise 
and merely envisages “a document or record, of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing 
or preparing an act of terrorism”.84 These instructions, “messages, images or representations” or 
information are often widely available to everyone on the internet through a simple Google search. 
Delineating the content to material that provides practical assistance, as developed under the EU 
standard for example, would constitute a more legitimate basis for criminalisation.  
 
3.2.2.3.  Actus reus 
Not only is it important to take into consideration the content of the message envisaged, but also 
the actus reus that is targeted by the offence. All criminal law provisions on self-study within the 
 
82 C. Walker, 'Written Evidence  (Cbs0001) in Response to the Joint Committee on Human Right’s Call for Evidence 
in Connection with the Counter Terrorism & Border Security Bill 2017-19' (2018) p. 8. 
83 C. Walker, op. cit., p. 9. See also Liberty, op. cit., p. 11.  
84 This vagueness has been criticised by Liberty (2018). See Liberty, 'Liberty’s Report Stage Briefing on the 
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provisions on receiving training for terrorist purposes do not specify the question of ‘how’ these 
instructions are received. The minimum standard within recital 11 of Directive 2017/541 only 
specifies that the act must result from “active conduct”.85 The annulled French provision, on the 
other hand, demanded the “habitually accessing” for conduct to be punishable, whereas s.58 TACT 
2000 in the UK holds the array of collecting, making, possessing, viewing or otherwise accessing 
those specific documents or records. The Bill initially envisaged to criminalise the viewing of such 
material “on three or more different occasions”, in order to reflect a pattern of behaviour.86 The 
‘three clicks rule’ was heavily criticised. Nonetheless, the eventual offence does not even demand 
a repetitious viewing.87 Moreover, individuals are not only targeted when they are “in control of 
the computer”, but also when they are “viewing the material, for example, over the controller’s 
shoulder”.88 These differences are important for an assessment by the Court. The act of 
transmitting, collecting or downloading may inherently bear more potential risk than the mere 
(single) viewing of a webpage.89 
 
3.2.2.4.  Intent of the actor 
The intent of the actor plays an important role within the assessment. The case law of the French 
Conseil constitutionnel may set an example for future cases before the European Court of Human 
Rights. In addition to the argument that the authorities already have a plentitude of means at their 
disposal (infra), the French Conseil constitutionnel annulled the provision twice on the grounds 
that there was not even a terrorist intent required and that the scope of the “bonne foi”-defence was 
insufficiently precise.90 Although the European Court found in Jobe v. UK that the “reasonable 
excuse”-defence ensures a fair balance, the French Conseil constitutionnel clearly believed that 
higher standards are required in cases of limitations on the right to freedom of expression.91 As 





85 It is criticised that a similar clause is not included in the body of the Directive itself. See Meijers Committee, op. 
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86 See Explanatory Notes to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (June 2018), para. 37; Home Office, 
‘Memorandum Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill: European Convention on Human Rights’ (6 June 2018), 
para 29. 
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88 Explanatory Notes to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (June 2018), para. 37.  
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3.3.  Necessity argument: A need for a specific criminal law approach? 
The third subpart of this legitimacy analysis consists of a necessity argument. In other words, the 
author argues that the legislature must always substantiate the need for a specific criminal law 
approach, before turning to this ultimum remedium. Although in legal doctrine, and even in policy 
documents, it is stressed that the legislator needs to analyse whether other measures address or 
could address the issue at hand more effectively,92 courts are in general reluctant to question the 
relevance of a criminal law provision. The French Conseil constitutionnel, however, has put this 
question at the forefront of its judgment in regard to the provision on habitually accessing certain 
online public communication services (art. 421-2-5-2 CP). The Conseil constitutionnel argued that 
the existing powers and means are already sufficiently broad.93 
By analysing its necessity, the Conseil constitutionnel “questions the relevance of the creation of 
the offence, not so say its very usefulness”.94 The focus of the Conseil constitutionnel on this 
principle of necessity has caused a lot of debate amongst scholars. Sizaire (2017), for example, 
refers to the decision and the “rediscovery of the principle of necessity” as “une petite révolution”.95 
Baranger (2017), on the other hand, criticises the political dimension of the decision and questions 
the authority of the Conseil constitutionnel in this context.96 Within weeks, the French government 
reinstated the provision, making only a few amendments. At the end of 2017, the Conseil 
constitutionnel annulled the article again on the same grounds.97 The entire saga has attracted much 
attention from scholars and legal practitioners.98 
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the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards an EU Criminal Policy: 
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2011). 
93 France, Conseil constitutionnel, no. 2016-611 QPC, 10 February 2017, para. 13. 
94 Translation of A. Gogorza and B. de Lamy, 'La Seconde Mort Constitutionnelle du Délit de Consultation Habituelle 
de Sites Terroristes', 5 La Semaine juridique. Édition générale (2018). 
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The European Court of Human Rights (in the context of other offences) has taken a more lenient 
stance in the sense that “the fact that there may be other measures available to protect against the 
harm does not render it disproportionate for a Government to resort to criminal prosecution, 
particularly when those other measures have not been shown to be more effective”.99 Although 
there is clearly no global or EU-wide trend of a reintroduction of the principle of necessity, the case 
law of the French Conseil constitutionnel might be considered as a positive evolution. From the 
point of view that the criminal law, and thus the introduction of new autonomous offences, should 
be regarded as a last resort, the French decision is a pioneer in the field. Hopefully, their judgment 
will act as an example for other jurisdictions.   
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
The right to seek, receive and impart information is a fundamental freedom, which – at first glance 
– seems to stand far apart from terrorism cases. Nonetheless, policymakers increasingly restrict 
this right with the aim to prevent the commission of a terrorist offence. New autonomous offences 
are enacted or the scope of existing offences is expanded to trigger the procedural set of tools of a 
criminal investigation in an earlier stage and to allow the prosecution of conduct that would not 
meet the threshold of long-established provisions. Especially the emergence of lone wolves and 
the rise of the internet as a training ground for terrorists have contributed to this evolution.  
The key message is justly summarised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (2018) in the UK: 
“criminalisation of passive activity is a dangerous direction of travel”.100 Although the European 
Court of Human Rights, as a court of last resort, seems to have “a more forgiving attitude” in its 
counter-terrorism jurisprudence,101 this contribution has aimed to demonstrate that the criminal law 
should adhere to the harm principle and that legislators should take greater account of the right to 
seek, receive and impart information so as to withstand any legitimacy challenges. There is no 
doubt that limiting illegal content can be justified when a person uses the internet to prepare a 
terrorist attack. However, the link with a potential terrorist offence in the future is often too tenuous 
in current legislation. The attributes of risk must incontestably be apparent from the wording of the 
criminal law provisions, which is not always the case. As human rights organisation Liberty (2018) 
rightly states, “overreliance on prosecutorial discretion can be no substitute for a sufficiently tightly 
drawn offence in the letter of the law itself”.102 The criminal liability of consumers of online content 
should, therefore, be limited to those cases in which there is a risk to future harm. Given the fact 
that scientific research has shown that there is no direct link between viewing terrorist content and 
becoming a terrorist (and thus disputing the ‘conveyor belt’ thesis), the constitutive elements of 
actus reus and mens rea must guarantee the blameworthiness of the conduct. Concerning the actus 
reus, the line should be drawn at the deliberate collection of information by which a consumer 
actively collects or downloads terrorist material that provides practical assistance for the 
commission of a terrorist attack. As such, the mere viewing of propaganda, for example, should 
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not be tackled by means of criminal law. The inclusion of a mens rea requirement that the act must 
be conducted for the purposes of the commission of a terrorist offence is necessary to limit the 
offence to only cover those persons that actually pose a risk. Moreover, these elements have to be 
formulated in clear language to ensure the accuracy, clarity, accessibility and predictability of the 
offence – hereby contributing to the principle of legality.103 All these safeguards could avoid an 
interference in a too early stage of the iter criminis, rendering the term itself meaningless by 
combining various criminal offences to punish – so to speak – the preparation of the preparation of 
a preparatory act. Above all, the necessity of new measures must always be balanced against the 
existing tool set, especially given the ultimum remedium nature of criminal law. In sum, even 
though remote harm offences are undeniably a part of our criminal law system in the twenty-first 
century, a clear framework is indispensable. The conclusions drawn in this contribution, therefore, 
offer an initial incentive to reflect upon some fundamental values when drafting far-reaching 
legislation. Future research should look into the adjudication in practice of these terrorism-related 
provisions and should invest in a similar critical-legal analysis of non-criminal law instruments that 
target terrorist content online. 
 
 
103 The principle of legality has not been considered an actual issue in case law. In France, for example, the elements 
of the crime description on « une entreprise individuelle » (art. 421-2-6 Code Pénal), were considered sufficiently 
precise by the Conseil constitutionnel, save the term “rechercher” (France, Conseil constitutionnel, no. 2017-625 QPC, 
7 April 2017). The Belgian Constitutional Court has come to a parallel conclusion with regard to the offences on 
providing and receiving terrorist training (art. 140quater and quinquies Sw.) (Belgium, Constitutional Court, Algemeen 
Belgisch Vakverbond and Ligue des Droits de l’Homme et al, no. 9/2015, 28 January 2015, Application Nos. 5710 and 
5711, paras. B.41.2; B.41.4; B.48-50). Only the French provision on habitually accessing online public communication 
services (art. 421-2-5-2 CP) was twice annulled by the Conseil constitutionnel on multiple grounds (France, Conseil 
constitutionnel, no. 2016-611 QPC, 10 February 2017; France, Conseil constitutionnel, no. 2017-682 QPC, 15 
December 2017). The rather lenient stance of the judiciary towards the legality principle raises questions and invites 
scholars to critically watch over the principle.   
